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Russo-Ukrainian Patterns of Genocide in the Twentieth Century
Abstract
Russo-Ukrainian relations in the 20th Century are dominated by genocide. Using Raphel
Lemkin and Martin Shaw as a guide, one finds that Russo-Ukrainian relations during the
20th Century was a long period of genocidal action, linked by periods of punctuated
genocides. These genocides included several political genocides that quelled Ukrainian
nationalism and independence and kept it subjugated to Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia's
genocide during the 20th Century was a carryover from Imperial Russia treatment of
Ukraine, the arch of which carries over into today's relations between the two countries.
Understanding this long period of genocide helps make sense of the enduring relationship
between the two countries.
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Introduction
In his classic treatise on the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides captures an
interesting discussion between delegates from Athens and Melos, two of
the war’s quarreling polities. Athens, the dominant power between the
two, sought Melos’ loyalty and alliance against Sparta. During the
discussion Melos refused to side with Athens.1 The Athenian delegation
then offered a stark warning to the weaker polity, suggesting
Since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are
discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on
the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept.2
This passage is an instructive tool in explaining Russian-Ukrainian
international relations from the founding of the Tsardom of Muscovy to
today. Russia, in all its variant forms throughout history, has been the
stronger polity and dominant actor on the international stage. Meanwhile,
Ukraine, long viewed by Russia as its weak little brother, has been forced
to endure inhumane treatment at Russia’s hands.
The twentieth century, a snapshot in time, provides an excellent case study
to examine this relationship. With the works of Raphael Lemkin, Martin
Shaw, and the United Nations (UN) law on genocide as a guide, Soviet
Russia employed genocide against Ukraine throughout the twentieth
century. Soviet Russia used genocide and ethnic cleansing, which,
provided their legal definitions, can be classified as genocide, to maintain
control over Ukraine, deny it and its people political sovereignty, and to
keep it within Soviet Russia’s sphere of influence.
This article begins with a survey of the analytical methods and terminology
used to do that analysis. This paper then transitions to a brief assessment
of power to demonstrate that for genocide to occur, power amongst actors
is important to understand. Then the paper moves into multiple examples
of genocide perpetrated by Soviet Russia against Ukraine. These include
denationalization through post-World War II (WWII) ethnic cleansing in
the Donets River Basin (Donbas), Crimea, and other parts of Ukraine, and
the repopulation of those areas with ethnic Russians. Next, Soviet political
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genocide, or politicide, is highlighted. Politicide is highlighted by
illustrating the various independence and insurgent movements that rose
during the twentieth century but were violently suppressed by Soviet
Russia. Lastly, this article discusses how Soviet Russia used famine as a
strategy to keep Ukraine weak and force compliance with Soviet
Communist ideology. This article concludes by connecting the past to
today and making a simple forecast for the future of Russo-Ukrainian
international relations.

Methodology and Analytical Framework
Lemkin and Shaw’s work on genocide and the UN Convention on genocide
are the baseline analytical tools used throughout this article.3 Lemkin,
Shaw, and the UN Convention are employed to measure Soviet Russian
genocidal activities levied against Ukraine during the twentieth century.
Lemkin was selected because his thoughts are the intellectual foundation
for the entire genocide studies field, while Shaw was selected because his
work forms a tight, easy-to-use taxonomy to apply towards a variety of
situations.
Lemkin, writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II and the
Holocaust, established a relatively loose, simple framework to define
genocide. Lemkin defines genocide as, “The destruction of a nation or of
an ethnic group.”4 He continues, stating that genocide is a two-part
process. The first phase consists of a coordinated plan of complementary
actions oriented on the destruction and subsequent liquidation of a given
national group.5 The second phase, a continuation of the coordinated plan
of complementary actions, consists of the oppressor imposing their own
national pattern on the targeted group.6
Despite warning that the use of descriptive terms and phrases is
inadequate because doing so tends to result in one or more aspects of
genocide being overlooked, Lemkin fills in the margins of his framework
by arguing that genocide is carried out in one or more of a series of fields
through coordinated attacks.7 These fields include political, social,
cultural, economic, biological, religious, moral, and physical.8 Within the
physical field of genocide, Lemkin further elaborates, contending that
rationing food based on race, endangering health, and mass killings are
animating subcomponents of this field.9 For the purpose of this study,
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which focuses on Soviet Russia’s treatment of Ukraine during the
twentieth century, Lemkin’s political genocide, cultural genocide, and
physical genocide are most applicable. Each of these terms are analyzed in
conjunction with justifying evidence later in this article.
On the other hand, Shaw, a contemporary sociologist, and expert in the
field of genocide studies, also provides a useful taxonomy for the study and
assessment of genocide. Shaw contends, “That genocide is a structural
phenomenon” that is both a “recurring pattern of social conflict” and it
maintains profound connections to additional “structures of conflict” and
societal formations of strength.10 Shaw continues by stressing that
genocide is a generalization, or scheme for scrutinizing and classifying any
number of observed events.11
Carrying this idea forward, Shaw argues that genocide is the result of
asymmetries in both armed and unarmed conflict. Furthermore, genocide
is categorized by the pattern of hostile moves enacted by a stronger actor
over a weaker actor.12 Shaw, building upon Lemkin’s concepts, refines his
thinking on genocide to a four-component taxonomy. According to Shaw,
there is genocide, genocidal action, a genocide, and genocidal violence.13
Genocide, the concept, is, “A form of violent social conflict or war between
armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups, and
those groups and other actors who resist this destruction.”14 The second
category, genocidal actions, are the physical acts of genocide perpetrated
by one actor against another to destroy the other’s societal position
through violence, intimidation, and killing.15 Shaw’s third category is a
genocide, which he contends is, “A large-scale episode, involving
substantial numbers of victims.”16 The final component is genocidal
violence. Shaw contends that this category, although like a genocide, is not
grand or wide-ranging enough, whether in number of victims or physical
reach, to register as a genocide and is therefore relegated to a lesser
position.17
Regarding ethnic cleansing, Lemkin does not use the term because it did
not exist at the time he was writing about genocide. However, his two
phases of genocide - the reciprocal relationship between the destruction of
a weaker actor’s national pattern and the replacement of that with the
stronger actors, which is often characterized by the removal of the targeted
actor’s population and the colonization of that territory by the aggressor -
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meets ethnic cleansing’s definitional threshold for use.18 Meanwhile, Shaw
writes that ethnic cleansing, a perpetrator’s term popularized in the 1990s,
“Oozes genocidal intent, resonating with the idea of destroying, if not
murdering, groups to which it is applied.”19 However, as the United
Nations notes, ethnic cleansing is not genocide by definition, but
depending on the ways in which it is waged and the effect on those being
ethnically cleansed, it can be a war crime, a crime against humanity, or
genocide.20
In summary, Lemkin and Shaw’s work on genocide and ethnic cleansing,
coupled with the UN Convention on genocide are used as the analytical
framework to measure Soviet Russian activities perpetrated against
Ukraine in the twentieth century. The purpose being to identify if a pattern
of genocide is discernible and make judgments about the continued
relations between the two countries based off their past. Before doing so,
however, it is instructive to briefly examine the role of power and how that
can result in genocidal actions.

The Role of Power in Genocide
Power is the critical feature to understand Russo-Ukrainian relations.
Power is not just useful for understanding how Russia has been able to
manipulate Ukraine over time, but how it (power) has been the lubricating
substance for Russian genocide. Robert Dahl summarizes power by stating
that one actor has power over another insofar as it can make the other
actor do something it would not otherwise do.21 For that to occur, both
actors must be in some sort of relationship, because without a connection
between the actors neither has the potential to exercise power over the
other.22 For power to be tangible and not a fleeting moment, an actor must
possess a base of power that can mobilize and generate relational power
for use against another actor..23
Charles Glaser and Michael Howard offer similar macro-level views on
power. Both Glaser and Howard’s views are relational. Glaser defines
power as the ratio of one actor’s resources relative to that of another actor
or actors. Resources, according to Glaser, are the tangible and intangible
capabilities that are converted into military capabilities.24 Howard, on the
other hand, writes that power is an actor’s ability to dominate its
environment in relation to its continued existence.25
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Understanding power and how it affects the relationship amongst strategic
actors is important to understanding how and why genocide occurs. With
the basics of power outlined, it is important to harken back to Thucydides’
Melian Dialogue. Moving forward in this work, it is useful to think of
Soviet Russia as Athens and Ukraine as Melos. Doing so makes it easier to
understand how Soviet Russia continually employed genocide against
Ukraine during the twentieth century.
The theories of power outlined herein are the animus for Lemkin’s two
phases of genocide. Soviet Russia, being the politically dominant
oppressor in the relationship, was able to denationalize Ukraine by
destroying Ukraine’s national pattern. In turn, Soviet Russia, the
dominant actor, was able to impose its own national pattern on Ukraine.
In the case of Soviet Russia, its national pattern consisted not only of the
Soviet ideology but also Russian culture.

Ethnic Cleansing, Denationalization, and Genocide
Orlando Figes provides an excellent starting point to begin the discussion
of Russian genocide in Ukraine. Figes contends that during Soviet Russia’s
rule over its union of socialist republics, Stalinization—the embodiment of
Soviet Russian policy throughout the Soviet Union—meant Russification.26
This meant that ethnic and cultural identity throughout the Soviet Union
was to be swept aside and Russian language, history, food, music, film,
dance, and ideology put in its place.27 The idea of eradicating an annexed
or conquered people’s way of life and replacing it with that of Russia, or
Soviet ideology, was a bulwark of Russian relations with its neighbors
since Ivan III took charge of the Tsardom of Moscovy in 1547.28
With the idea of relative power serving as the animus for Russian
interactions with the other members of the Soviet Union, Soviet Russia
conducted large-scale ethnic cleansing against many groups following its
victory in WWII. Soviet Russia deported seven distinct groups of people
from their homeland, spread those people across eastern and central
Russia, and repopulated those nations with ethnic Russian people. 29 Those
groups included the Crimean Tartars, the Kalmyks of Astrakhan, the
Chechens, the Ingushi, the Karachi, the Balkars, and the Meshketian
Turks. These groups were forcibly removed from their homes in Soviet
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Crimea, the Caucasus, and Caspian Sea regions for both perceived and
confirmed cooperation with Nazi Germany during the war.30 Antony
Beevor notes that upwards of 270,000 Ukrainians, either willingly or
unwillingly, worked for Nazi Germany as it occupied eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union.31
For the Crimean Tartars, the post-war ethnic cleansing of Crimea
continued a tsarist policy of denationalization first implemented by
Catherine II following the peninsula’s annexation from the Crimean
Khanate in 1783.32 By the time Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev gifted
Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 the peninsula had been all but gutted of its
native Tartars. Of Crimea’s 1.2 million inhabitants, 71 percent of those
people were Russians, 22 percent Ukrainians, and the remainder
consisting of Tartars and other ethnic groups.33
Ukraine, a menagerie of people and cultures, also caught Soviet Russia’s
ire at wars end. Soviet Russia deported many Poles and all but cleared
central and eastern Ukraine of its native German population. For instance,
the river regions of eastern Ukraine dominated by the Don, Donets, and
Volga Rivers, which hosted the Volga Germans, were hit quite hard. By
1947, Soviet Russia’s ethnic cleansing of Poles and Germans, and its
Jewish pogroms pushed Ukraine from a multicultural country to a bipolar
state, or what Serhii Plokhy stylized as a Ukrainian-Russian
condominium.34
Further denationalization occurred in Ukraine in 1954. Moscow gifted
Crimea to Ukraine. The gift of Crimea, a Trojan Horse of sorts, injected
nearly another million Russians into Ukraine, providing Russia with an
additional lever through which it could manipulate Ukraine. This served as
a subtle method by which Soviet Russia further injected its national
character into Ukraine.35
To summarize, Russia, whose foreign policy has always viewed Ukraine as
an extension of itself, as illustrated by Russia’s use of phrases like little
brother, southern Russia, and New Russia employed population
manipulation and ethnic cleansing in the post-World War II period to
denationalize Ukraine.36 Russia used ethnic cleansing to erode Ukraine’s
historic national character throughout the twentieth century to make it
politically and socially disjointed. Doing so allowed Soviet Russia to keep
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Ukraine aligned with Soviet Communist ideology. However, if one employs
a historical eye towards the two countries interconnectedness, Russia’s
genocidal actions against Ukraine allowed it to keep Ukraine in a pseudoprotectorate status. Doing so, in effect, maintained the Russo-Ukrainian
status quo dating back to the 1654 agreement between Cossack Hetman
Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Aleksei Romanov.37

Soviet Russian Political Genocide
Soviet Russia employed politicide against Ukraine during the twentieth
century for a two-fold purpose. First, Russia sought to eliminate Ukrainian
nationalism and various independence movements. Second, Russia used
genocide against Ukraine to drive Ukraine’s political and ideological
assimilation.
Founded in 1942 in western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
(UPA) pushed for Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union through
the 1940s and 1950s.38 At its peak, the UPA had 40,000 fighters.39 The
UPA was the militant wing of the right-wing Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929.40 The OUN and the UPA’s goals
were an ethnically homogenous and independent Ukraine. However, by
1947 the Soviet Union, leveraging its Polish, Czechoslovakian, and
Ukrainian subsidiaries whittled down the UPA to the point that it operated
underground and had to rely on small-scale terrorist attacks and
assassinations.41
Soviet victory in World War II accelerated the UPA and OUN’s defeat.
Eliminated by 1949, and despite Ukrainian Nikita Khrushchev holding
Soviet Premiership in the wake of Stalin’s reign, Soviet authorities in
Moscow forcibly moved to erase the entire episode from memory, covering
up official and unofficial records.42 Trevor Erlacher notes that in the
decades following the death of Stalin, and notwithstanding the post-Stalin
thaw of the mid-twentieth century, the Soviet Union tightened its
stranglehold on information to, “Enhance its control over the public
discourse and closely manage the quality, quantity, and context of
references to the OUN and UPA.”43 At the same time, Moscow actively
sought to rewrite Russo-Ukrainian history to illustrate the brotherhood of
both nations and peoples through time, while thrusting Russian national
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identity to the fore, and all but removing Ukrainian history from the
record altogether.44
Soviet Russia’s handling of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals and
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is but one example, largely lost to the
collective memory, of how Moscow maintained power over Ukraine,
eroded Ukraine’s national character, and instead imposed that of Soviet
Russia. Although Ukrainian nationalism and independence finally won out
on December 1, 1991, Soviet Russia quelled other attempts in the twentieth
century.45 As Plokhy notes, Ukraine attempted statehood three other times
during Soviet Russian dominance. The first of which was in Kyiv and Lviv
in 1918, followed by an additional attempt in Transcarpathia in 1939, and
the final attempt coming in Lviv in 1941.46
Soviet Russian power vis-à-vis allowed it to wage genocide throughout
Ukraine during the twentieth century. More precisely, Soviet Russia’s
policy toward Ukraine was one of denationalization, or the process of
eroding Ukraine’s national character. Soviet Russia accomplished this by
denying social and political freedom to Ukraine, while simultaneously
foisting Russian language, culture, and historical narratives on Ukraine.
Russia further denationalized Ukraine through the terms by which it used
to describe the country. Phrases such as Little Russia, Southern Russia,
New Russia, and The Ukraine, instead of Ukraine, were all intended to
undermine Ukrainian national character and subconsciously attack
Ukrainian national solidarity. The use of Russian versions of Ukrainian
names, such as Kiev instead of Kyiv, or Khakov instead of Kharkiv, are
further examples of how Soviet Russia used language to denationalize
Ukraine.
Lemkin’s fields of genocide are a useful taxonomy for one inclined to apply
labels to this form of genocide. While Soviet Russian activities in this
section apply to nearly all of Lemkin’s fields of genocide, political genocide
and social genocide are the most apropos.47 However, examining this
section’s genocidal action in relation to the UN Convention’s ruling on
genocide, shows that it falls short of meeting the threshold for genocide
defined by international law. It falls short because Soviet genocidal action
and genocidal violence in the aforementioned cases does not meet or
surpass the parameters defined in the Convention, which are focused on
the destruction of a selected group of people. Soviet Russian activity noted
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above instead focused on denying true independence, by maintaining
Ukrainian subservience using political ideology.
Denationalization through the twentieth century resulted in another effect
on Ukraine. Soviet Russia’s disassociation of Ukrainian society and
Ukrainian nationalism resulted in Soviet Russia’s genocidal violence being
all but lost to history. Further, Moscow’s effort to bury and obscure
nationalist and independence movements like those carried out by the
OUN and UPA, among others, resulted in these events becoming hidden
genocides beyond the borders of Eastern Europe.
Moreover, Soviet Russia’s manipulation of information as it related to the
trauma it inflicted on the Ukrainian people during this period is a classic
example of Jeffrey Alexander’s cultural trauma theory. Soviet Russia, the
power broker amongst collective actors, denied carrier groups the ability
to aggregate Ukrainian trauma, thereby denying them the opportunity to
embrace that cultural trauma.48 To put it in more plain terms, Soviet
Russia covered up Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian nationalist
movements. They did so to dislocate the movement, to deny its ability to
engender support, and to keep Ukraine pliable to Soviet Russian ideology.
It is only in Ukraine’s post-Soviet era that that cultural trauma has been
embraced.49

Famine and Starvation as a Tool of Political Strategy
Soviet Russia used starvation as a strategy between 1921 and 1946 to keep
Ukraine politically weak and thereby ideologically aligned toward Moscow,
resulting in three major famines during that period. The conditions that
generated each of these were similar. In each case, the Ukrainian
peasantry was upset about collectivization. Soviet collectivization
directives coming from Moscow resulted in peasants losing their land to
the state. Those peasant holdings, whether individual farms or local
communes, transitioned into large state-run collective farms.
Furthermore, collectivization resulted in the peasant farmers having to
yield their livestock and farming implements to those farms. Moreover,
before the collective farms could share their profits with their toiling
peasantry the Soviet Union received its quota of profit from the farm.50
What was not exacted by the state went back to the farm to cover operating
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costs. The remainder, often little, went to the peasantry working the
farms.51
The exploitation of collectivization angered the peasantry. In 1921, peasant
uprisings broke out across the Soviet Union, including Ukraine.52
Furthermore, many peasants passively resisted collectivization by killing
off their livestock, breaking farming tools, and hiding grain and seeds.53
The Soviet Union used food as a weapon to combat peasant revolts.
Moscow intentionally withheld grain from the farms to pressure the
peasants into compliance and punish non-compliance. In 1922, as famine
conditions set in across the Soviet Union, to include Ukraine, Moscow
refused to ease these restrictions all the while insisting that grain
procurement and grain exports continue. The effects were devastating
throughout the Soviet Union, resulting in 23 million deaths.54 Ukraine, for
its part, suffered approximately 2 million of those deaths.55
Authors and historians alike contend that the famines wrought against
Ukraine were not the product of bad harvests or drought, as Soviet leaders
and Russian apologists contend. Instead, Roman Serbyn writes that the
famines were a strategy to punish the Ukrainian peasantry for not
complying with collectivization. Moscow sought to punish the peasantry by
consciously neglecting the crisis, while maintaining state-mandated grain
and foodstuff quotas and withholding food from the peasantry.56
Ukraine’s Holodomor, the famine and starvation of 1932-1933 followed
the same pattern as that of 1921-1923. Stalin’s Five Year Plan of 1928,
which sought to increase collective farming production by 128 percent by
1934, was a major difference between the 1921-1923’s famine and the
Holodomor.57 This Five Year Plan rapidly increased the toll on farmland
and the peasants that worked it, without providing additional relief or
support to either.58 Moscow, well-aware of the deteriorating situation in
Ukraine, did nothing to relieve the famine as vast and deep starvation set
in across the country.59 In doing nothing to offset the widespread
starvation ravaging Ukraine, Moscow tacitly approved starvation as a
political strategy to advance its political ideology while extinguishing
dissention.
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Immediately following World War II another famine and starvation
occurred in the Soviet Union. This famine, following a similar causal
pattern as the previous two, affected more of the Soviet Union than did the
famines of 1921 and 1932. Nonetheless, out of 790,000 deaths, Ukraine
suffered 258,000 or 33 percent of the starvation’s fatalities.60 Michael
Ellman argues that Moscow used starvation as a tool of strategy to
terrorize Ukraine into submission and as a substitute for ethnic cleansing
programs.61
Soviet Russia’s use of starvation as a tool of strategy to enforce policy
clearly meets Lemkin’s threshold for genocide. In this instance, Moscow’s
policies toward Ukraine were clear examples of economic genocide. 62
Soviet Russia used starvation, a complementary strategy to
collectivization, to destroy the economic foundation of Ukraine and
replace it with Soviet industrialization. Moreover, Soviet Russia employed
what Lemkin calls physical genocide, or the physical destruction or
annihilation of national groups through discrimination in feeding and
endangering the health through restricted access to food.63 Lastly, Soviet
Russia’s use of starvation as a strategy to bring Ukraine to heel and to keep
it docile is a clear violation of Article II(c) of the UN convention on
genocide. Article II(c), one of five elements of genocide, states that
genocide is the act of, “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”64
The Moscow-sponsored starvation strategies levied against Ukraine during
the early- and mid-twentieth centuries are textbook examples of genocide.

Conclusion
The examination of Russo-Ukrainian relations through the twentieth
century makes many things clear. First, power dominates the two
country’s interactions, much like power dominated the interaction
between Athens and Melos during the Peloponnesian War. Russia, our
Athens, has largely been able to do what it wants regarding Ukraine
because it is more powerful than the latter. Ukraine, our Melos, has had to
endure what it must because it lacked the power to effectively counter
Russian dominance. Post-WWII ethnic cleansing, violently suppressing
three separate independence movements and a two-decade long
insurgency, and three punctuated starvations, all within the twentieth
century demonstrate that genocidal action is a tool of Russian foreign
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policy. Russia conducted genocide and ethnic cleansing to keep Ukraine
docile to support both Russification, from a cultural standpoint, and Soviet
indoctrination, from a political position.
John Lewis Gaddis contends that historians interpret the past for the
purpose of the present.65 With Gaddis’ postulate in mind, it is important to
ask, how does Soviet Russia’s treatment of Ukraine impact RussoUkrainian international relations today? Since breaking free of the prison
house of nations in 1991, Ukraine has pursued its own foreign policy. In
doing so, it has become closer with Western Europe and the United States.
As a result, it has cultivated collective actors, new supporters, and carrier
groups, and thus educated the world on its checkered history with Soviet
Russia. Breaking free from Russia denied Russia’s ability to wage direct,
overt genocidal action in Ukraine.
However, as Russia has emerged from the fog and discombobulation of the
immediate post-Soviet era, it looks to rebuild many vestiges of its imperial
and Soviet past, of which Ukraine is a central component.66 Ukraine, as the
2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbas indicate, factors
heavily into Russian president Vladimir Putin’s grand strategic vision for
Russia moving forward. During the 2014 invasion of Eastern Ukraine,
Russia’s strategic objectives included capturing six regions of Ukraine, but
due to un-forecasted international uproar, they succeeded in obtaining
only two of those regions.67 To make up for that shortcoming Russia has
weaponized citizenship and passports. Specifically, Russia is expediting
the citizenship process and offering Russian passports to upwards of one
million people in demographically similar regions of Eastern Ukraine.68 If
Russia is able to further Russify those regions it can make them ripe for a
similar annexation and invasion to that of Crimea and the Donbas.
To the outsider looking in, Russification and denationalization appear to
be working. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s July 2020
acceptance of Russian territorial gains in the Donbas through the quasirecognition of the Donetsk People’s Army and Luhansk People’s Army as
the region’s governing bodies are one example.69 Voting is another
example. Elections throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine in October
2020, in which pro-Russian candidates outlasted many of their pro-Kyiv
counterparts, further demonstrate the slow growth of Russification in
Ukraine today.70
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Like Soviet Russia’s use of starvation in the early- and mid-twentieth
century to manipulate Ukraine, Russia uses food, water, and essential
services as leverage points with Kyiv. For example, Russia denied Ukraine
natural gas during the winters of 2006 and 2009 to apply political
pressure on Kyiv.71 The recent Nord Stream 2 gas deal reached between
Kyiv and Moscow, which allows Russia to pump natural gas not only to
Ukraine, but through Ukraine to many outlets across Europe, will likely
serve as leverage to pressure or discredit Kyiv in the future.72
Water, on the other hand, is another resource factoring into the two
countries relations. Drought and the lack of water in Crimea is increasing
political tension between Moscow and Kyiv.73 Prior to Russia’s 2014
annexation of Crimea, Ukraine provided the Crimea with most of its
drinking water. However, following Crimea’s annexation, Kyiv
discontinued that practice. In doing so, the water crisis reached fever pitch
by August 2020.74 Kyiv insists that providing water to Crimea gives
credence to Russia’s claim to the region and it therefore refuses to support
Crimea.75 Water is also a problem in the Donbas.76 Six years of combat has
damaged and contaminated many of the region’s reservoirs, which keeps
3.6 million people supplied with fresh water.77
Russia is still deeply invested in keeping Ukraine close to Moscow. Despite
Ukraine’s hard-won independence of 1991, Russia is conducting a
subversive campaign, focused on weaponizing citizenship and discrediting
Kyiv by manipulating access to immediate need resources, and to
denationalize Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s goal of denationalizing and
Russifying Eastern Ukraine is to ripen it for further territorial gain.
Lastly, Lemkin and Shaw’s conceptual body of work on genocide are useful
tools for both examining and explaining how Russia has sought to erode
Ukraine’s national character and identity and replace it with one in step
with Moscow. In doing so, Lemkin and Shaw’s work, if examined in
conjunction with the United Nations Convention on genocide,
demonstrates that Russia used genocide and ethnic cleansing during the
twentieth century to bend Ukraine to Moscow’s ends. Given Russia’s postSoviet foreign policy towards Ukraine, it is important to keep watch on this
region to ensure additional genocides do not metastasize.
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